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RECENT DECISIONS

CRIMINAL LAW-NATIONAL STOLEN PROPERTY ACT--APPLICATION OF
v. UNITED STATEs--Defendant, as payee, knowingly negotiated forged

KANN

checks at Jackson, Michigan. The checks were forwarded to the drawee bank
in Missouri for payment and were returned unpaid. Defendant was convicted
for violation of the National Stolen Property Act.1· The Circuit Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed 2 on authority of Kann v. United States.8 On
certiorari to the United States Supreme Court, held, reversed. The circuit court
erred in basing its interpretation of the National Stolen Property Act on Ktmtn 'U.
Umted States. Two justices dissented without opinion. Umted States"· Sb~
dan, (U.S. 1946) 67 S. Ct. 332.
That the Supreme Court's interpretation of the mail fraud statute ' in Kann

1 " • • • whoever with unlawful or fraudulent intent shall transport or -cause to be
transported in interstate or foreign commerce any falsely made, forged, altered, or
counterfeited securities ••• shall be punished by a fine of not more than $10,000 or by
imprisonment for not more than ten years, or both••••" 53 Stat. L. n78, § I
(1939), IS U.S.C. (1940) § 415. The statute's definition of securities includes
checks.
2 152 F. (2d) 57 (1945).
•
8 323 U.S. 88, 65 S. Ct. 148 (1944).
'"Whoever, having devised ••• any scheme or artifice to defraud, or for obtaining money or property by means of false or fraudulent pretences ••• shall, for the purpose of executing such scheme or artifice • • • place, or cause to be placed, any letter
••• in any post office, or •.• cause to be delivered by mail ••• any such letter ••• shall
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v. United States will not be extended to the National Stolen Property Act·will
hardly be consoling to those peripatetic persons whose profession is forgery and
the confidence game. In the Kann case, defendants undertook to defraud the
corporation of which they were officers by a plan which involved the drawing of
checks of the corporation on out-of-state-banks. These checks were cashed at a
local bank which mailed them to the drawee for payment. The court said that
when the proceeds of the checks wern. obtained, the scheme was completely
executed and the subsequent mailing by the bank contributed nothing to defendants' plan. 5 Accordingly, it was ruled as a matter of law that the mailing by
the bank was not "for the purpose of executing such scheme" as required by the
statute. 6 Prior to the Kann case it had not been doubted that a conviction under
the National Stolen Property Act would be sustained under the facts of the
principal case. However, that case appeared to present a golden opportunity to
persons serving sentences under this section and they lost no time in attempting
to apply the theory of the Kann case to the National Stolen Property Act. 7 The
present defendant contended that he had not "caused" the transportation in
interstate commer<;e and that if he had "caused" the transportation, it was not
with ·"unlawful or fraudulent intent." The matter of causation gave the court
little trouble since even in the Kann case it was felt that defendants had caused
the mailing. 8 Defendant's primary contention,_however, was that the transportation could not have been "with unlawful or fraudulent intent," as required by
the statute, because he had received the fruits of his fraud, and was not, therefore, concerned with the subsequent disposition of the checks. In other words,
defendant insisted that "unlawful or fraudulent intent" as used in the National
Stolen Property Act be given the same meaning the court had given "for the
purpose ·of executing such scheme" as used in the mail fraud statute. The coun
found, however, that the transportation in interstate commerce in the principal
case was within the scope of the National Stolen Property Act because of-the different purposes Congress had in mind in passing the two statutes. The primary
purpose of the mail fraud statute was to prevent the use of the United States mail
as an agency for carrying out a fraudulent scheme. 9 The National Stolen Propbe fined not more than one thousand dollars, or imprisoned for not more than five years
or both." 35 Stat. L. 1130, § 215 (1909), 18 U.S.C. (1940) § 338.
5
Four justices concurred in Justice Douglas' dissent on this point. It was felt that the
fraudulent scheme was continuous, and smooth clearance of the checks was necessary to
enable them to continue -the plan and to prevent disclosure. For an interesting and
critical comment on the Kann case see 31 VAL. REv. 671 (1945).
6
Supra, note 4.
7
The Kann case was decided Decembh 4, 1944. On January 12, 1945, application for habeas corpus based on the Kann case against the Warden at Atlanta Penitentiary was rejected. Tolle v. Sanford, (D.C. Ga. 1945) 58 F. Supp. 695. A similar
application based on the Kann case and the circuit court decision in the principal case
was denied in Clarke v. Sanford, (C.C.A. 5th, 1946) 156 F. (2d) II5. In United
States v. Wood, (D.C. W. Va. 1945) 58 F. Supp. 451, decided January 12, 1945, the
Kann case was held to be a good defense. It was rejected in United States v. Lemons,
(D.C. Mo. 1946) 67 F. Supp. 985.
8
See Spillers v. _United States, (C.C.A. 5th, 1931) 47 F. (2d) 893; United
States v. Kenofsky, 243 U.S. 440, 37 S. Ct. 438 (1917).
9 See Durland v. United States, 161 U.S. 306, 16 S. Ct. 508 (1896). The
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erty Act, on the other hand, was aimed at preventing the pollution of interstate
commerce 10 and implementing co-operation between_ local and federal law enforcement officials. 11 The court found that the words "unlawful or fraudulent
intent" add nothing to the substantive offense, but merely prevent the act from
covering transportation by innocent persons. Furthermore, it aJ?pears that the
conviction in the principal case would have been sustained even though the act
·had contained the words "for the purpose of executing such scheme." The court
recognized that defendant knew the checks would be dishonored ·and that the
time consumed in transmitting them for payment would give him time to commit further frauds in the vicinity and also give him an opportunity to make his
departure and avoid apprehension. 12 While the court's decision in the Kann
case may be regretted in view of the narrow construction placed on the mail
fraud statute, it is fortunate that the doctrine was not extended to the present act
which has made possible a great deal of progress in the detection and apprehension of forgers and confidence men.
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history of the mail fra;d statute is exhaustively reviewed by Compton in his comment
on the Kann case, 31 VA. L. REv. 671 (1945).
10 The theory of the act is the same as that of the National Motor Vehicle Theft
Act, 41 Stat. L. 324, c. 89 (1919), 18 U.S.C. (1940) § 408, which was held to be
constitutional in Brooks v. United States, 267 U.S. 432, 45 S. Ct. 345 (1925).
11 The National Stolen Property Act as originally passed, 48 Stat. L. 794 (1934),
was one of a s;ries of acts passed at that time to curb the notorious felons of that
period against whom local agencies seemed to be completely ineffective. Among those
acts were 48 Stat. L. 781 (1934), 18 U,S.C. (1940) § 408a (kidnaping and extortion); 48 Stat. L. 782 (1934), 18 U.S.C. (1940) § 408e (flight in interstate commerce to avoid prosecution or testifying); 48 Stat. L. 783 (1934), 12 U.S.C. (1940)
§ 588 et seq. (bank robbery); 48 Stat. L. 979 (1934), 18 U.S.C. (1940) § 42cid
(anti-racketeering); 48 Stat. L. 1236 (1934), 26 U.S.C. (1940) §§ 2721 et seq.
(National Firearms Act).
12 Apparently the mailing in the Kann case was not to conceal the fraud because
it was not discovered by return of the checks unpaid, but by an examination of the
corporation books. In view of his dissent in the Kann case, it is interesting to note that
Justice Douglas dissented without opinion in the principal case.

